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Regression-based path- and structural equation-models have two major drawbacks, if they 
are used for the causal explanation of social phenomena: they are too deterministic and 
neglect the intentions of the concerned actors as a central driving force of the analysed 
processes. In order to explain the distribution-effects of two party competition, this article 
proposes an alternative modelling approach, which is based on the mathematical theory 
of repeated games. The article explores the limits and possibilities of this approach with 
regard to the causal explanation of social phenomena and compares the results with the 
capabilities of the regression approach. It turns out that game theoretical models are 
especially useful for explaining the non-presence of social phenomena under given causal 
conditions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Competition is one of the key concepts for understanding the distribution of scarce 
resources and goods. It is a form of con ict between two or more actors / parties over 
the sharing of a good, in which they have an antagonistic interest. The competition 
between industrial  rms for market shares, military con icts between nation states 
over territories, or party competition for votes in parliamentary elections are just 
a few examples, which illustrate the importance of the struggle over the distribution 
of scarce goods (Gabszewicz & Thisse 1999, Barnett et al. 1993).
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If quantitative social scientists are asked to explain the outcome of a complex 
social process like the mentioned two-actor competition, they generally point to 
regression-based research techniques like path- or structural equation-modelling 
(Asher 1991, Kelloway 1998, Pearl 2001: chap. 5, Blalock 1971). The design of 
such models starts with a network of abstract variables connected by links, which 
represent the major impacts within the analysed network. If the variables refer 
to sequential points in time, it is generally argued that the network-links stand 
for causal relations, which can be translated into systems of linear regression 
equations.
Fig. 1 Example of a causal explanation with a path-model 
Fig. 1 gives a very simple example of this design process in order to explain 
the respective shares S and (1-S) of two competing actors ! and " by their power 
P! and P". However, apart from the problematic assumptions of linearity (Abbott 
1988), this formalization also illustrates some typical shortcomings of this kind of 
statistical modelling:
1)  Path- and structural equation-models are deterministic: any deviance of the 
model from observational data is considered to be due to measurement- or 
sampling-errors #. Thus, there is no room for free will in terms of a choice 
between alternative options, typically available to social actors (Earman 1986: 
chap. 12).
2)  Path- and structural equation-models are mainly driven by the past and not 
by the intentions of social actors about their future (Stout 1996: chap. 2–3; 
Schueler 2003: chap. 2–3). Contrary to the causal explanation of physical 
phenomena, plans about the future are highly important for social phenomena: 
the essence of social competition is e.g. the plan to outperform one or several 
rivals.
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Tab. 1 The general structure of a game with two actors, 2x2 strategies, and payoffs 
ai,j and bi,j
Actor !:
Strategy 1: Strategy 2:
Actor ": Strategy 3: b3,1 ; a3,1 b3,2 ; a3,2
Strategy 4: b4,1 ; a4,1 b4,2 ; a4,2
Legend: ai,j = Payoff of actor ! from own strategy j and strategy i, played by actor ". 
bi,j = Payoff of actor " from own strategy i and strategy j, played by actor !.
As an alternative to the mentioned type of deterministic models with an over-
emphasis on the past, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) developed more than 
60 years ago the mathematical theory of games (Osborne 2004), where two actors 
! and " are assumed to play each against the other. Each of the actors has at least 
two strategies as alternative options for choice. The behaviour of the actors is 
insofar driven by intentions, as each party attempts to get the highest possible 
returns from the game, by choosing an appropriate strategy. This choice is strongly 
in uenced by the associated payoff-matrix (see Tab. 1), which shows for each pair 
of strategies chosen by the two actors the respective returns. Hence, it seems that 
game theory is able to overcome the mentioned problems of classical path- and 
structural equation modelling. Consequently, this paper uses game theory in order 
to demonstrate that it is possible to explain a rather universal social phenomenon 
like competition by an exemplary causal model, which is not deterministic and 
not only driven by the past. The case of social competition will however also be 
useful for a more general discussion about the explanandum in social science and 
the limits of explainability of social phenomena.
2. COMPETITION AS A REPEATED GAME
Due to the formal structure of mathematical game theory, we are going to analyse 
a rather simpli ed type of competition with only two actors ! and ". They are 
assumed to have different amounts of social power P! and P" in order to increase 
their respective shares S and 1-S in a highly appreciated good G. Thus, between 
the two parties there is a potential con ict: actor ! uses its power P! in order to 
increase its current share S. Similarly, actor " makes use of its power P", in order 
to increase its own complementary share 1-S in the good G, by striving for a part 
of the share S of its competitor !. In an earlier empirical study (Mueller 2006), the 
author has applied these ideas to the struggle about the distribution of the gross 
domestic product GDP and the associated personal income distribution. The actors 
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! and " were in this study the employers on the one hand and the workers and 
employees on the other.
Tab. 2 The impact of the strategies selected by the two actors ! and " on the #S – 
dynamics
Actor !:
dS = 0: dS = +c:
Actor ": dS = 0: #S = 0 #S = +c
dS = -c: #S = -c #S = 0
Legend: dS=0, dS=+c, dS=-c: Strategies „status quo by withdrawing”, „increase of S”, and „decrease of S”, 
respectively. #S: Real change of S, depending on the pair of the selected strategies.
Whether the mentioned potential con ict about the shares S and (1-S) becomes 
real or not, depends on the strategies used by the two actors. In order to ensure 
a minimum of alternatives for choice, game theory assumes that each player has 
always at least two strategies. Moreover, to keep the complexity of the model as 
low as possible, we postulate that each actor has exactly this minimum number 
of two strategies: actor ! may either attempt to maintain the status quo of the 
distribution by withdrawing (dS=0) or increase its share by the amount dS=+c > 0 
(see Tab. 2). Similarly, the other actor " can either aim at maintaining the status 
quo of the distribution by withdrawing (dS=0) or decrease the share S by dS=-c 
such that its own share 1-S increases correspondingly. The third existing strategy 
of increasing the share S of its competitor by dS=+c is not in the interest of actor 
" and belongs only to the strategy-inventory of actor ! (see Tab. 2).
If both actors aim at maintaining the status quo by the strategy dS=0 of 
withdrawing, the real distribution S of the considered good G will probably 
not change: $S = 0 and consequently also $(1-S) = 0 (see Tab. 2). If only actor 
! attempts to change the situation by increasing its share in the good G, while 
the competitor " withdraws, actor ! will win the game: according to Tab. 2, the 
combination of the strategies dS=0 and dS=+c results in a shift $S=+c of the 
distribution of the good G at the expense of the withdrawing actor ". In a similar 
way, actor " may be the only party, which attempts to change the situation by 
increasing its share 1-S in the good G, while the other withdraws by using the 
strategy dS=0. In this case, actor " will win the game, as the combination of the 
strategies dS=-c and dS=0 results in a shift $S=-c of the distribution of the good 
G (see Tab. 2), which is consequently changed at the expense of the more passive 
competitor !. Finally, both actors may strive for a realization of their interests by 
playing the strategies dS=+c and dS=-c. If the two actors are relatively equal with 
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regard to their power P! and P", the result is a costly „battle“ with no real change 
of S, neither in favour of the  rst nor of the second party. Thus, Tab. 2 postulates 
for this situation that $S=0 and consequently also $(1-S)=0.
Fig. 2 Gains of the actors ! and ", by share S in good G
The last-mentioned scenario of a fruitless „battle“ between two ambitious 
competitors points to the fact that the use of strategies entails costs and promises 
gains in the case of a victory. Regarding the costs, there is only one really critical 
situation: if dS=-c and dS=+c, each actor is harassed by the power of its rival. We 
assume that this situation entails for actor ! costs -P" and for actor " an analogous 
penalty -P! (see Tab. 3), where in both cases costs correspond to the power of the 
rival. For all other pairs of strategies, there is no real con ict and consequently no 
cost of con ict (see Tab. 3), since at least one of the two parties withdraws.
Regarding the gains, two out of four possible pairs of strategies contribute 
nothing to the payoffs of the concerned actors, as $S=0. According to Tab. 2, this 
situation occurs if both actors use the same strategy, i.e. either withdraw or strive 
for their interests. In the other two cases, one actor  ghts and the other withdraws 
and the result is either a shift by $S=+c or by $S=-c. Their signi cance in terms 
of psychological gains depends on the value of S (Samuelson & Nordhaus 1989: 
447 ff.): if the share S of actor ! is relatively big, $S=+c means for the other 
actor " an important loss, i.e. a negative gain. Actor " is in this situation already 
deprived by its low complementary share 1-S and additionally loses c units. For 
actor !, however, the same change $S=+c is only a small positive gain, as ! gets 
in an already privileged situation with a high share S a relatively small number of 
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units, which psychologically do not really matter. By a similar reasoning, it can 
be shown that for a small S, the shift $S=+c means a small loss for actor " but 
a big gain for actor !. Fig. 2 formalises the mentioned effects on the basis of the 
hypothesis that the mentioned gains are marginal utilities approximated by the  rst 
derivatives of the logarithmic utility functions ln(S) and ln(1-S) of the shares of 
the actors ! and ".1
Tab. 3 The payoff-matrix of the competition-game
Actor !:
dS = 0: dS = +c:
Actor ": dS = 0: 0 ; 0 -1/(1-S) ; 1/S
dS = -c: 1/(1-S) ; -1/S -P! ; -P"
Legend: dS=0, dS=+c, dS=-c: Strategies. Table entries . ; .. : Payoffs of actors " (.) and ! (..).
P! = Power of actor ! = Con ict costs of actor ". P" = Power of actor " = Con ict costs of actor !. 
S = Share of actor ! in good G. 1/S = Gains of actor ! from change #S=+c. 1/(1-S) = Gains of actor " 
from change #S=-c.
The balance of the costs and the positive or negative gains de nes the so called 
payoff of a game, which is a key-concept in mathematical game theory. Hence, we 
have summarized the previous discussion of this section by adding the different 
gains and costs. Their balance is presented in Tab. 3 as a payoff-matrix for the 
actors ! and ". As we are assuming here a repeated game that is played over many 
rounds, it changes its characteristics over time: some payoffs are depending on the 
share S (see Tab. 3), which in turn is changed by the choice of strategies by the 
actors ! and " (see Tab. 2). The dynamics of S and the associated payoffs, which 
are both the result of this feedback-loop, will be analysed in the following section 3.
3. THE DYNAMICS AND EQUILIBRIA OF THE COMPETITION-GAME
As mentioned at the end of section 2, the payoffs of the actors ! and " are strongly 
in uenced by their shares S and (1-S) in the commonly appreciated good G. If S 
is very low, i.e. near zero, the gains of actor ! from striving for an increase in S 
are relatively high (see Fig. 2). Consequently, the payoffs of the left-hand-side 
matrix in Fig. 3 show that the strategy dS=+c is for actor ! always better than the 
alternative strategy dS=0, independently on whether actor " uses the strategy dS=0 
or dS=-c. Hence, the choice of the strategy dS=+c by actor ! compels the other 
actor " to use its strategy dS=0 in order to minimize this way its losses. Thus for 
rational actors there is one deterministic pure strategy Nash-equilibrium2: dS=0 
and dS=+c. It entails an increase $S=+c of the share S and thus privileges actor 
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!, which dominates the game. If this dominance game (Osborne 2004: 45 ff.) is 
repeated over a long period of time, zone I on the axis S becomes instable, since 
the associated growth process  nally drives S from zone I to zone III.
A similar situation occurs, if S is very high. For S%1, it is actor " instead of actor 
!, which is favoured by high gains (see Fig. 2), when attempting to realize its interest 
in a decrease of S. As the matrix on the right-hand-side of Fig. 3 demonstrates, 
strategy dS=-c gives actor " always better payoffs than the alternative strategy 
dS=0 of withdrawal, independently of the strategy chosen by the other actor !. 
Thus, if actor " opts for strategy dS=-c, actor ! has only one reasonable choice, 
which minimizes its losses in terms of negative payoffs: dS=0 (see Fig. 3). The 
result is a game dominated by actor " with one Nash-solution: dS=-c and dS=0. In 
a situation of a repeated game, there is a long series of shifts $S=-c, which create 
left of S=1 a zone II of instability, since S is continuously driven from zone II to 
zone III.
Fig. 3 The payoffs of the three sub-games for $- < $+, by share S in good G 3
If the share S is neither very high nor very low, the type of the game may 
change. This always happens, if S reaches a critical value, where the order of two 
payoffs of Tab. 3 changes. As some payoffs of Tab. 3 are always positive or always 
negative, there are only two critical comparisons for further analysis:
1)  The strategy-pair dS=-c and dS=0 versus the strategy pair dS=-c and dS=+c 
(see Tab. 3). It can be shown4 that the order of the payoffs of these strategy pairs 
changes for actor !, whenever S reaches the limit &- = 1/P".
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2)  The strategy-pair dS=0 and dS=+c versus the strategy pair dS=-c and dS=+c 
(see Tab. 3). It is possible to proof 5 that the order of the payoffs of these strategy 
pairs changes for actor ", whenever S reaches the limit &+ = 1 - 1/P!.
If the power-indices P! and P" of both actors are greater than 2, the limits &- 
and &+ are ordered in the way of Fig. 3: !- < !+ .6 Between these limits &- and &+, 
the actors ! and " play a game different from the dominance games discussed 
up to here. According to the payoff-matrix in the middle of Fig. 3, it is a so-
called chicken game (Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakis 1995: 35 ff.). If the two 
actors co-operate, they may decide that both permanently withdraw by playing the 
strategy dS=0. For both parties, there are however strong incentives in terms of 
positive payoffs (see Fig. 3), which may induce them to abandon this agreement 
and to play independently each of the other. In this new situation there are two 
deterministic and one probabilistic Nash-solutions. The two deterministic Nash-
solutions require pure strategies, where either actor ! or alternatively actor "!
permanently withdraws by using its strategy dS=0 (Diekmann 2009: 38 ff.). As 
one of the two actors is in terms of $S a constant looser, this solution cannot 
be stable: the permanent looser will soon abandon the strategy dS=0, in order to 
challenge the competitor by negative payoffs and to get this way to the other pure 
strategy Nash-equilibrium, which consequently makes the other actor a constant 
looser. The dynamics of this competition between the two deterministic pure 
strategy Nash-equilibria are obviously unpredictable. Similarly, also the results 
of the probabilistic Nash-solution (Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakis 1995: 197 ff.) 
are rather unpredictable: in order to maximize their expected payoff, both actors 
would have to switch between their respective strategies in a probabilistic way by 
using mixed strategies (Osborne 2004: chap. 4.3). With regard to the dynamics of 
the share S, this means a random walk between the limits &- and &+. In sum, zone III 
on the axis S between &- and &+ is quasi-stable with rather unpredictable choices of 
strategies. Due to the nature of the chicken game with several Nash-solutions and 
a considerable moral hazard to abandon the strategies of co-operative withdrawals, 
S should permanently  uctuate between the mentioned limits &- and &+.
Obviously, the afore-analysed scenario &- < &+ is not the only situation to be 
studied. If !- = !+ , the two limits coincide and the zone of stability is just one point 
on the axis S with the value &- = &+. As this situation occurs only very rarely, it will 
not be discussed any further. A much more frequent scenario is, however, !- > !+ 
(see Fig. 4). It occurs, if at least one of the power-indices P! or P" is rather small. 
It can be shown that in this case the sub-game between the limits &+ and &- is not 
a chicken game but a prisoners‘ dilemma (Osborne 2004: chap. 2.2; Axelrod 1984: 
chap. 1). It has a deterministic pure strategy Nash-solution dS=-c and dS=+c, which 
however yields for both actors negative payoffs (see Tab. 3). Thus it is reasonable, 
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if both actors ! and " switch to a co-operative solution, where both parties 
withdraw from „ ghting” by using the same strategy dS=0. As both actors have 
a better alternative (see Fig. 4), there is a considerable moral hazard of defection, 
which will occasionally entail a shift $S=+c or $S=-c. If both actors protect their 
willingness to co-operate by the TIT-for-TAT-strategy recommended by Axelrod 
(1984: chap. 2), the victim of the immediately preceding defection will return to the 
pure strategy Nash-solution dS=-c and dS=+c, which entails $S=0 and stabilizes 
the share of S for a while somewhere between &- and &+. However, as the costs of 
this Nash-solution are for both actors rather high, another change of strategies is 
likely. In sum, the joint reactions to a prisoners‘ dilemma are as unpredictable and 
non-deterministic as the reactions in the mentioned chicken game. Consequently, 
in the long run, it is most likely that S will moderately  uctuate between the limits 
&- and &+ and thus entail quasi-stability of the distribution S.
Fig. 4 The prisoners‘ dilemma as an alternative to the chicken game of Fig. 3, if $+< $- 
4. CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS: A COMPARISON OF TWO MODELS
This article started with a rather critical assessment of path- and regression-models: 
we considered them as too deterministic and too much driven by the past. As an 
alternative, we developed and analysed in the preceding sections 2 and 3 a repeated 
game, describing the competition for a scarce good G. For assessing the progress 
of this new model over the path- and regression-approach and for disclosing its 
potential drawbacks, we will in the following compare the two models, especially 
with regard to their explanatory power. For this purpose, we are making some 
virtual experiments, by changing the values of P! and S of the actor ! and drawing 
in Fig. 5 some causal inferences from these changes. (Wilson 1985: pp. 118 ff.; 
Von Wright 1975: 107 ff.)
A  rst quasi-experiment is a change of the share S of the actor ! by $S from the 
level == to a higher level ==‘ (see Fig. 5). Under the assumptions of the regression 
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model, the share S should immediately return to the original level ==, as the 
actor ! does not have enough power to defend and maintain the higher level ==‘. 
Hence, in the regression model, the power P! strictly determines the possibilities 
of the actor !. This is much less the case for the game theoretical approach to 
social competition. A shift of S from the level == to a higher level ==‘ does not 
necessarily entail a return to the original level ==. In the game theoretical model, 
the increase $S may e.g. be the result of a temporary deviance of actor ! from a co-
operative agreement in a chicken game (see section 3). It is even possible that S 
also increases in the next following period, because the actors ! and " are playing 
for a while the equilibrium strategy pair (dS=+c, dS=0) of the chicken game, which 
obviously favours the actor !. Hence, in the game theoretical approach to social 
competition, individual actors may not have total freedom as they are depending 
on others. However, their degree of freedom is higher than in the relatively over-
determined regression model.
Fig. 5 Causal inferences from quasi-experimental changes of S and P!: The regres-
sion- versus the game theoretical model
A second quasi-experiment is a decrease in the power of actor ! by -$P! units, 
where S is assumed to be constant and relatively low. In Fig. 5, this corresponds to 
a shift from point x to point x‘, both being below the upper limit &+. According to 
the regression model, this quasi experiment should immediately entail the causal 
effect of a decrease of S from the level of x‘ to the lower level of x‘‘. Thus the 
change of P! is the causal explanation of the drop of S: the past perfectly determines 
the future. In the game theoretical model there is no such causation, as the change 
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from point x to point x‘ does not necessarily imply a further shift from point x‘ to 
point x‘‘. The actors ! and " may e.g. both play their co-operative strategies dS=0 
such that S does not change, in spite of a loss of power of actor !. 
The mentioned change of power -$P!, however, matters for the upper limit &+, 
which con nes by de nition the zone of indeterminacy (see Fig. 5). This is 
important for the third quasi-experiment in Fig. 5. If the afore-mentioned decrease 
in the power of actor !  by -$P! units occurs in a situation, where S is near the 
upper limit &+, a shift from point o to point o‘ has in the game theoretical model 
a real causal effect (see Fig. 5): it destabilizes the share S of the actor ! and entails 
a drop in S by -c units from the level o‘ to the new level o‘‘. This drop is the result 
of the intention of the other actor " to increase its share 1-S in the good G by the 
use of strategy dS=-c, as well as the intention of the actor ! to avoid the costs -P" 
of a fruitless  ght with this competitor ". Thus, by looking at the intentions of the 
two competitors, the game theoretical model is able to give an explanation for the 
disappearance of the observation o‘, which is based on the idea of  nal causality 
(Hassing 1997). The shift of observation o‘ to a new co-ordinate o‘‘ is however not 
only an effect of the actors‘ intentions but also a result of structural changes in the 
immediate past, which represent classical causality: as mentioned earlier, the loss 
of power $P! has lowered the upper limit &+ and transformed the original payoff-
matrix such that the new situation at point o‘ no longer corresponds to a chicken 
game or prisoners‘ dilemma but rather to a dominance game (see Fig. 3).
5. SOME GENERALISATIONS
Obviously, not every game theory model has the properties of the competition 
game described in the previous sections 2 and 3. With regard to generalizations 
and possible applications of this model to other domains, we brie y summarize the 
key features of the model of competition between the two actors ! and " in a very 
general way, thus also using new variables Y and Xi. The dependent variable Y 
corresponds in the previous sections to the share S and the independent variables 
Xi were previously the power resources P! and P".
1)  Generally, there are two types of mathematical links between the payoff-matrix 
of the game and the independent and the dependent variables Xi and Y, which 
constitute some kind of a feedback-loop: on the one hand, Xi and Y in uence 
the payoff of the game. On the other hand, the strategies chosen on the grounds 
of this payoff-matrix determine the change of the dependent variable Y.
2)  For very high values of the dependent variable Y, the game is dominated by 
actor ", which is supposed to be interested in a decrease of Y. Consequently, if 
the game is repeatedly played, this actor is able to lower the values of Y (see 
Fig. 6).
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3)  In an analogous way, if the values of the dependent variable Y are low, the 
game is dominated by the other actor !, which is assumed to be interested in an 
increase of Y. Consequently, in this situation, Y is assumed to grow due to the 
repetitive nature of the game (see Fig. 6).
4)  Because of the mentioned dependency of the payoff on Xi and Y, the payoff-
matrix is transformed by changes of Y. Above of a certain limit &- and below 
of an analogous limit &+, the game is no longer dominated by one of the two 
actors. In this zone III, the game becomes either a chicken game, or a prisoners‘ 
dilemma, or an other game with stabilizing effects on the dependent variable 
Y (see Fig. 6).
As shown by the quasi-experiments of the previous section 4, the most 
innovative feature of game theoretical models, which ful l the afore-mentioned 
properties (1), (2), (3), and (4), is their ability to explain „lacunas“ in the zones 
above and below the limits &+ and &-: due to the mentioned instabilities, empirical 
observations should be rare in these zones. Our model of competition assumes that 
the size and the shape of these zones are consequences of „classical“ causation 
by past changes in the power-structure. However, the instability prevailing in these 
zones, is considered to be a result of  nal causation of actors pursuing their goals.
Fig. 6 The general structure of a game theoretical explanation of Y
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In sharp contrast to its virtues with regard to the zones of instability, the game 
theoretical model does not give any real explanation of the observed data, which 
are generally concentrated in zone III between the mentioned limits &+ and &-. 
Contrary to the classical regression models, game theory models assume that 
the precise co-ordinates of a data-point in this zone are indeterminate and can 
at best be explained by the history of the selected strategies, but generally not 
by structural factors. Thus, there is a radical shift in the explanandum: instead 
of giving a positive explanation of the observational data, the mentioned game 
theoretical models explain their absence in certain zones of the data space.
At a  rst glance, this „agnosticism“ seems to impair the usability of the 
mentioned game theoretic models for pragmatic purposes like planning or 
forecasting, etc. A more detailed analysis, however, makes clear that this kind of 
model still offers a lot of useful facilities:
a)  Short- and middle-range forecasts are still possible. The upper and lower limits 
&+ and &- de ne the range of possible futures. Contrary to conventional forecasts, 
there are no point-estimates for one speci c future, but intervals of whole sets 
of possible futures. This is more realistic than the conventional approach. It has 
however the disadvantage that the mentioned intervals tend to grow and make 
the forecast less and less precise, if the prognosticated time-horizon increases.
b)  The mentioned game theoretical models can also be instrumental for the 
planning of public and other policies. Among others, they can directly be used 
for feasibility studies: policy goals are only feasible, if they fall into the stable 
interval between the limits &+ and &-. Sometimes, these boundaries even allow 
to assess, how much additional resources, e.g. in terms of money or institutional 
power, are needed, in order to realize the mentioned goals in zone III of Fig. 6.
c)  It is also possible to make empirical tests of causal hypotheses derived from 
the model. As illustrated in Fig. 5, the model allows to make causal inferences 
about the effects, resulting from changes of its main variables. These effects 
can subsequently be compared with the observed data, just by using techniques 
from conventional statistical methodology. Besides, as a special feature already 
mentioned before, the model allows to deduce hypotheses about lacunas in 
the data space, which afterwards can be compared with the multidimensional, 
statistical distribution of the corresponding observational data.7
6. STATISTICAL PROCEDURES FOR ESTIMATING THE LIMITS !+ AND !-
In order to meet the afore-mentioned targets (a) to (c), the limits &+ and &- have to 
be determined with a suf cient amount of precision. The payoffs of game theoretic 
models are generally hard to observe and thus cannot be used for the estimation of 
these boundaries. However, in many situations, the multidimensional distribution 
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of the dependent variable Y and its structural determinants X1,...,Xn is easily 
available. From Fig. 6 we know, that &+ and &- de ne the limits between the lacunas 
of the data-space on the one hand and the zone of relative stability on the other. 
Thus, Mueller (2003) has proposed to approximate these boundaries between the 
lacunas and the clouds of the data-space by an iterative statistical procedure. It starts 
with the explanation of Y by structural factors X1,...,Xn, using the conventional 
OLS-regression method and yielding a  rst regression line 1 (see Fig. 7). After 
removing all data-points below this regression line, the remaining observations, 
which have in Fig. 7 the signatures o and +, are used for the calculation of another 
regression line 2. Then, the negative residuals, which are in Fig. 7 denoted by o, 
are again removed in order to be able to construct this way a regression line 3. By 
means of the structural factors X1,...,Xn, it explains the Y-values of the remaining 
data-points with the signatures +. In Fig. 7, this regression line is already a good 
approximation of the upper limit &+. If the differences between &+ and the remaining 
data-points were still too big, the iterative estimation process could be continued, 
until the statistical signi cance of the coef cient of determination r2 reaches the 
best possible value and begins to deteriorate, if the process of discarding negative 
residuals is continued. By an analogous regression-procedure it is also possible to 
determine the other, lower limit &-.
Fig. 7 The estimation of the upper limit $+ by iteratively reweighted least squares 
regressions
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The proposed method for estimating &+ corresponds to an iteratively reweighted 
least-squares procedure IRLS (Rubin 1983) with weights w=1 for the positive 
residuals and w=0 for the negative ones. This implicit choice of the w-parameters 
has the disadvantage of systematically reducing the number of data-points, that can 
be processed by the regression algorithm. Hence, as an alternative, it is proposed 
to set the weight w of the negative residuals to a small positive value different from 
zero, e.g. w=0.1, which approximately corresponds to the  nal share of positive 
residuals in the last step of the iterative regressions. By performing IRLS-regression 
in this alternative way, the number of data-points remains constant and allows to 
continue the regressions until the estimated parameters describing &+ converge 
to stable  nal values. There is, however, the disadvantage that the mentioned 
regression coef cients are slightly biased by the in uence of the negative residuals 
with a low weight w different from zero.
7. CONCLUSIONS
As shown in the previous section, this article proposes the use of statistical regression 
in a new way: instead of explaining observed data-points by deterministic causal 
models, it focuses on the analysis of the lacunas in the data-space by explaining 
their limits &+ and &-. This corresponds to the idea that there are on the one hand 
zones of instability (see Fig. 7), where actors are crowded out by the pursuit 
of antagonistic interests and asymmetries in the power-distribution. Here, the 
behaviour of actors is relatively predictable. On the other hand there is a zone 
of indeterminacy con ned by the limits &+ and &-. In this zone, the behaviour 
of actors is unpredictable, due to free will, incomplete rationality, or randomly 
mixed strategies. Sociologist adhering to structural paradigms should accept this 
gap of knowledge as „insurmountable“: there is enough work do be done in order 
to explain the limits &+ and &- by structural theories and empirical analyses.
NOTES
1  For actor !: If utility U = ln(S) " dU/dS = 1/S = marginal utility of an increase of S (see 
Fig. 2). For actor ": If utility U = ln(1-S) " dU/dS = -1/(1-S) = marginal utility of an 
increase of S " +1/(1-S) = marginal utility of a decrease of S (see Fig. 2).
2  For a general de nition of the Nash-equilibrium, see Osborne (2004: chap. 2.6).
3 Figure adapted form an earlier work (Mueller 2006: 2162) of the author. 
4  If the share of the actor ! in the good G reaches the critical value S=&-, there is by 
de nition an equality of payoffs -1/S = -P"!(see Tab. 3). Thus S = -1/ -P"!= 1/ P"!= &-.
5  If the share in the actor ! in the good G reaches the critical value S=& +, there is by 
de nition an equality of payoffs -1/(1-S) = -P!!(see Tab. 3). Thus 1-S = -1/ -P! = 1/ P!!
and consequently S = 1 - 1/ P!!= &+.
6  From P"!> 2 follows &- =1/ P"!< 1/2. Similarly, P!!> 2 implies &+ = 1 - 1/ P!!> 1/2. Thus 
&- < &+.
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7   See e.g. the empirical analysis of the limits of social inequality by Mueller (2006) or 
section 6 of this article.
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